EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW- STRAND V.
PETERSBURG PUBLIC SCHOOL AND FRIDRIKSSON V.
ALASKA USA FEDERAL CREDIT UNION:

THE SUPREME COURT CHARTS AN UNCERTAIN COURSE

W RICHARD FossEy*

I.

INTRODUCTION

Alaska's Human Rights Act prohibits an employer from discriminating against an individual on the basis of race, religion, color,
national origin, sex, marital status, changes in marital status, pregnancy, or parenthood.1 The Act is modeled after Title VII of the
Federal Civil Rights Act of 1964.2 Repeatedly, the Alaska Supreme
Court has purported to look to United States Supreme Court deciCopyright © 1984 by Alaska Law Review
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I. ALASKA STAT. § 18.80.220(a)(1) (1981) provides:
(a) It is unlawful for
(1) an employer to refuse employment to a person, or to bar him
from employment, or to discriminate against him in compensation or in a
term, condition, or privilege of employment because of his race, religion,
color or national origin, or because of his age, physical handicap, sex, marital status, changes in marital status, pregnancy or parenthood when the
reasonable demands of the position do not require distinction on the basis
of age, physical handicap, sex, marital status, changes in marital status,
pregnancy or parenthood.
2. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l) (1981) provides:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer - [to]
(1) fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise
to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; ....
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sions interpreting Title VII for guidance in analyzing cases under
3
Alaska's Human Rights Act.
In Strand v. Petersburg Public Schools,4 the Alaska Supreme
Court sustained a decision by the Alaska State Commission for
Human Rights that a small school district committed an act of sex
discrimination when it failed to hire a female teacher to fill an elementary school principal position.5 The court's decision is important
because it affirmed the Commission's determination that once the
teacher presented a prima facie case of discrimination, the burden of
persuasion shifted to the school district to show that sex was not a
factor in its hiring decision. 6 This allocation of the burden of persuasion directly conflicts 7with United States Supreme Court decisions
interpreting Title VII.
In Alaska USA FederalCredit Union v. Fridrikssonsthe Alaska
Supreme Court upheld the decision of the Commission for Human
Rights that a female teller was rejected for a branch manager position because of sex discrimination, even though the Commission specifically found that her employer had not willfully and intentionally
discriminated. Again, this holding is contrary to United States
Supreme Court decisions which declare that a plaintiff alleging disparate, discriminatory treatment by an employer must show the employer's discriminatory intent. 9
This article has a threefold purpose. First, it compares federal
case law interpreting employment discrimination cases under Title
VII with the Alaska Supreme Court decisions in Strand and Fridriksson. This comparison will show that while the Alaska Supreme
Court professes to follow federal precedent in deciding discrimination cases, it has in fact radically departed from that precedent. As a
result, once a complainant presents a prima facie case of discrimination, the employer has the burden of proving that he did not discriminate. Furthermore, the court has held that an employee who alleges
disparate and discriminatory treatment by an employer may prevail
even when the finder of fact determines that the employer did not
willfully or intentionally discriminate.
3. See Strand v. Petersburg Public Schools, 659 P.2d 1218, 1222 n.7 (Alaska
1983); Alaska USA Federal Credit Union v. Fridriksson, 642 P.2d 804, 806 n.2
(Alaska 1982); Alaska State Comm'n for Human Rights v. Yellow Cab, 611 P.2d
487, 490 (Alaska 1980).
4. 659 P.2d 1218 (Alaska 1983).
5. Id at 1223.
6. Strand v. Petersburg Public Schools, Alaska State Comm'n for Human
Rights, No. S-77-0620-319-E-E at 7 (August 17, 1979) [hereinafter referred to as
ASCHR decision, August 17, 1979].
7. See infra notes 10-35 and accompanying text.
8. 642 P.2d 804 (Alaska 1983).
9. See infra notes 10-35 and accompanying text.
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Second, the article compares federal case law, which permits

employers hiring persons for supervisory or managerial positions to
use subjective hiring procedures, with the Alaska Supreme Court's

decisions in Strand and Fridrksson. This comparison will reveal
that the Alaska Supreme Court is hostile to all subjective hiring procedures, even when used to hire supervisors or managers.
Third, the article contends that the Alaska Supreme Court
should reject its holdings in Strand and Fridriksson and adopt the
analytical approach of the United States Supreme Court in deciding

employment discrimination cases.
II.

THE FEDERAL APPROACH To EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION CLAIMS

Although Title VII of the Civil Rights Act was passed in 1964,
the United States Supreme Court did not establish a framework for
deciding employment discrimination cases alleging disparate treatment until 1973. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green 10 set forth a
three-step process for the "order and allegation of proof' in dispa-

rate treatment cases." In the first step the plaintiff must establish a
prima facie case. In the second step the employer has an opportunity

to rebut the prima facie case by articulating some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for his conduct. In the final step the plaintiff is

given an opportunity to show that the employer's
explanation is only
12
a pretext for intentional discrimination.
10. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
11. Id at 802-05.
12. Title VII plaintiffs alleging employment discrimination may proceed under

two theories: disparate treatment and disparate impact. The model of McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), applies only to employment discrimination cases in which the plaintiff alleges disparate treatment. The United States
Supreme Court defined these theories in International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United
States, 431 U.S. 324, 336 n.15 (1977).
In disparate treatment cases, the plaintiff is alleging that the employer discriminated against the plaintiff because he is a member of a protected class. A plaintiff
proceeding under the disparate treatment theory must prove discriminatory motive.
On the other hand, discriminatory motive need not be shown in cases proceeding
under the disparate impact theory. Id
Disparate impact cases generally involve a claim that an employment practice,
although neutral on its face, has the effect of discriminating against a minority
group. Job qualifications which reduce the number of qualified minority applicants
but which bear no relation to the position being filled are a prime example of an
employment practice which has a disparate impact on minority groups. Unless the
practice has some legitimate business justification, the employer commits an unlawful act of employment discrimination regardless of his motivation. See Griggs v.
Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431-32 (1971).
For an excellent analysis of case law concerning disparate impact cases, see
Smith, Employer Defenses in Employment DiscriminationLitigation: 4 Re-assessment
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The court indicated that the first step - establishing a prima
facie case - requires the satisfaction of a four-part test. Under the
McDonnell Douglas test for determining whether a plaintiff has
presented a prima facie case of discrimination under Title VII, the
complainant must show:
1. That he or she belongs to a protected class;
2. That he or she applied and was qualified for a job for which
the employer was seeking applicants;
3. That despite his or her qualifications, the plaintiff was rejected; and
4. That after the rejection, the position remained open and the
employer continued to seek applications from persons with the
3
plaintiffs qualifications. 1
Federal courts have been flexible in applying the fourth element
of the four-part test. Indeed, all a plaintiff has been required tct do in
some cases to satisfy the fourth element is to produce a set of circumstances which, if unexplained, appear more likely than not to be the
4
result of discriminatory motives.'
McDonnell Douglas produced a clear analytical framework in
which the plaintiff in a Title VII case bears the burdens of production and persuasion in establishing a prima facie case. There was
confusion, however, in many lower courts concerning the nature of
the employer's burden in rebutting the plaintiffs prima facie case.' 5
Under McDonnellDouglas, the plaintiff can make a prima facie case
upon a fairly sketchy presentation. If the employer is required to
rebut this case by a preponderance of the evidence, or by the even
heavier burden of clear and convincing evidence, then there has
been a shift in the burden of proof because the employer's burden of
persuasion when attempting to disprove a discriminatory motive is
considerably greater than the plaintiffs burden in presenting a prima
facie case.
McDonnell Douglas held only that the employer must "articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason" for the allegedly
discriminatory conduct. 16 Some lower courts, however, interpreted
the employer's burden of articulating a nondiscriminatory motive to
be the burden of going forward;' 7 others held that the employer
bears the burden of persuading the court that his motives were nonof Burdens ofProofandSubstantive StandardsFollowing Texas Departmentof Community Affairs v. Burdine, 55 TEMP. L.Q. 372 (1982).
13. 411 U.S. at 802.
14. Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 576 (1978).
15. See infra notes 17-18 and accompanying text.
16. 411 U.S. at 802.
17. Bittar v. Air Can., 512 F.2d 582, 583 (5th Cir. 1975).
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discriminatory by a "preponderance of the evidence." 18
In Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters, 19 the United States
Supreme Court issued the first of four opinions clarifying the employer's burden when rebutting a plaintiff's prima facie case. The
Court explained that a prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas
should not be equated with an ultimate finding that the employer
engaged in illegal discrimination. Instead, the plaintiffs prima facie
case merely raises an inference of discrimination by presenting facts
which, if unexplained, show more likely than not that the employment decision was based on illegal motives. The Court made it quite
clear that "to dispel the adverse inference from a prima facie showing under McDonnell Douglas, the employer need only 'articulate
some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employee's
rejection.' "20
In the second decision attempting to clarify the employer's burden, Board of Trustees v. Sweeney, 2 1 the Court reemphasized that the
employer's burden of articulating a nondiscriminatory reason for its
conduct does not mean that the employer must prove an absence of
discriminatory motive when rebutting the plaintiffs prima facie
case.2 2 "[W]e think that there is a significant distinction between
merely 'articulat[ing] some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason'
and 'prov[ing] absence of discriminatory motive.' By reaffirming
and emphasizing the McDonnell Douglas analysis in Furnco . . .we
to meet the employee's
made it clear that the former will2 suffice
3
prima facie case of discrimination."
In the third decision, Texas Departmentof Community Affairs v.
Burdine,24 the Court established beyond any doubt that the employer does not have the burden of persuasion in rebutting a prima
facie case of discrimination in the federal courts. Once a plaintiff
has presented a prima facie case, the employer has the burden of
producing evidence of nondiscriminatory motive. Nevertheless,
'tihe plaintff retains the burden of persuasion." 25 Moreover, although the plaintiff has an opportunity to show that the employer's
response to a prima facie case is a pretext for illegal discrimination,
"[t]his burden now merges with the ultimate burden of persuading
18. Turner v. Texas Instruments, Inc., 555 F.2d 1251, 1255 (5th Cir. 1977);
Ostapowicz v. Johnson Bronze Co., 541 F.2d 394, 399 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied,

429 U.S. 1041 (1977).
19. 438 U.S. 567 (1978).

20. Id at 578 (quoting McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802).
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

439 U.S. 24 (1978).
Id at 25.
Id
450 U.S. 248 (1981).
Id at 256 (emphasis added).
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the court that [the plaintiff] has been the victim of intentional
' '26
discrimination.
In April 1983, the Court issued the last of the four decisions,

United States Postal Service Board of Governors v. Aiken. 27 The

Court reiterated that the burden of persuasion in an employment
discrimination case always remains with the plaintiff. The incontrovertible learning derived from these cases is that the normal burden
of persuasion borne by the plaintiff is unaffected in an employment
discrimination case under Title VII. At the same time, though, the
Court cautioned lower courts against applying its McDonnell Douglas test in an inflexible manner. In Aiken, a black postal employee
accused the United States Postal Service of racial discrimination
when it failed to promote him. The district court ruled in favor of
the Postal Service, but the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia reversed.28 The Supreme Court vacated the District of Columbia Circuit's opinion and remanded the case for reconsideration
in light of Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine.29

On remand, the court of appeals again held that the district
court had erred in requiring Aiken to present direct proof of his employer's discriminatory intent and in requiring Aiken to show as part
of his prima facie case that he was as qualified as, or more qualified
than, the people who were promoted.30 The Court granted certiorari
to review the case a second time.3 ' The Postal Service argued that
Aiken had not made out a prima facie case by the mere showing that
he was a member of a minority group with minimum qualifications
who was rejected for promotion in favor of a nonminority candidate.
In the Postal Service's view, Aiken was required to present evidence
that he was as qualified as, or more qualified than, the individuals
who were promoted in order to establish a prima facie case. The
Postal Service argued that Aiken should lose because he failed to
32
make such a showing.

The Court rejected a ritualistic analysis that only considered
whether Aiken had presented sufficient evidence for a prima facie
case. The Court found that, by focusing on the question whether
Aiken established a prima facie case, the district court had evaded
the ultimate issue whether the Postal Service discriminated against
Aiken. 33
26. Id
27. 103 S. Ct. 1478 (1983).
28. Aiken v. United States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors, 642 F.2d 514 (D.C.

Cir. 1980).
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

453
665
455
103
Id

U.S. 902 (1981).
F.2d 1057 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
U.S. 1015 (1982).
S. Ct. at 1481.
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The "factual inquiry" in a Title VII case is "whether the defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff." In other
words, is the "employer. . .treating 'some people less favorably
than others because of their race, color, religion, sex or national
origin."' The primafacie case method established in McDonnell
Douglas was "never intended to be rigid, mechanized, or ritualistic. Rather, it is merely a sensible, orderly way to evaluate the
evidence in the light of common'34experience as it bears on the critical question of discrimination."
In short, Aiken stands for the proposition that the McDonnell
Douglas test for determining whether a plaintiff has made out a
prima facie case is only a useful way of evaluating the evidence. The
Court made it clear that the federal courts should not permit a rigid
application of the McDonnellDouglas test to divert them from deciding the ultimate issue: whether or not unlawful discrimination occurred. In addition to criticizing slavish adherence to the prima facie
case requirements and reaffirming that the burden of proof always
remains with the plaintiff, the Court's opinion in Aiken establishes
that in order for a plaintiff to succeed in a Title VII discrimination
case, there must be a finding that the employer intentionally discriminated against him.35 This finding of intentional discrimination is
the sine qua non for recovery under the federal courts' interpretations of Title VII.

III.

EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION UNDER THE ALASKA HUMAN
RIGHTS ACT: THE ALASKA SUPREME COURT CHARTS
ITS OWN COURSE

A. Alaska USA Federal Credit Union v. Fridriksson." No
Intentional Discrimination Is Necessary for Recovery
In October 1975, Valgerdi R. Fridriksson, a female employee of
Alaska USA Federal Credit Union (Alaska USA), applied for the
position of branch manager of the credit union's Adak office. She
was rejected for the position, and a male applicant was hired.
Fridriksson then filed a complaint with the Alaska State Commissex discrimination in violation of
sion for Human Rights, alleging
36
the Alaska Human Rights Act.
When she applied for the position, Fridriksson had been employed by the credit union for four months as a teller in Adak's two34. Id at 1482 (citations omitted).
35. Id See also International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324,
335 n.15 (1977); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-06 (1973).
36. ALASKA STAT. § 18.80.220(a)(1) (1981).
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person office. Her sole prior work experience included nineteen
months as a teller for a bank in Iceland, and one year in that bank's
savings and loan department. That employment ended in 1965, and
Fridriksson had no further employment experience until she began
working for the credit union in Adak ten years later.37
A hearing was held on Fridriksson's complaint in June 1977.
The Commission ruled in Fridriksson's favor. Alaska USA appealed to the superior court. The superior court upheld the Commission's decision. Alaska USA then appealed to the Alaska
Supreme Court. The supreme court also affirmed the Commission's
finding that Fridriksson was the victim of illegal sex
discrimination. 38
Utilizing the McDonnell Douglas four-part test, the Alaska
Supreme Court found that Fridriksson had made out a prima facie
case of sex discrimination. Specifically, the court found that (1) as a
woman she was a member of a protected class; (2) she applied and
was qualified for the vacant branch manager position; (3) she was
rejected despite her qualifications; and (4) the position remained
open and Alaska USA continued to seek applicants for that
39
position.
Alaska USA argued that Fridriksson was not qualified for the
position and, thus, that she failed to present a prima facie case of
discrimination. The credit union contended that one of the qualifications for the position was that the branch manager have previous
management experience or management education. Alaska USA's
general manager testified that while there were no "hard cast qualifications" 40 for the branch manager's position, the credit union was
looking for the "best person."' 41 He specifically testified that the
credit union was looking for someone with supervisory or administrative experience. 42 Other testimony before the hearing officer indicated that a high school education was the only "educational"
requirement for the branch manager position and that Fridriksson
met this requirement. 43 Furthermore, Alaska USA's prior branch
manager at Adak and the credit union loan officer sent to Adak
when the outgoing manager was terminated both indicated that
Fridriksson was qualified for the branch manager position.
In an opinion written by Justice Matthews, the court rejected
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

642 P.2d 804, 805 (Alaska 1982).
Id
Id at 806.
Id at 807 n.4.
Id
Id
Id at 808.
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Alaska USA's argument that Fridriksson was not qualified for the
position. Of particular importance to Alaska employers is that the
court noted that the qualifications component of the McDonnell
Douglas test can be sensibly applied only if the qualifications are
objective and actually established for the position in question.44 Although the court acknowledged that education or experience might
constitute an objective qualification for the position, it found in this
case that the only objective qualification for the branch manager position was a high school education. Alaska USA's desire for a perdescribed as a
son with managerial or supervisory experience was
"mere preference," not an objective qualification. 45
Having found that Fridriksson presented a prima facie case, the
court then examined whether Alaska USA rebutted her case by articulating "'some legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the employee's rejection.' "46 Alaska USA presented four reasons for
declining to promote Fridriksson: (1) that she would not commit herself to staying in Adak for a two-year period; (2) that Fridriksson's
five-person family was too large to occupy the credit union's twobedroom trailer at Adak; (3) that it would be too costly to train
Fridriksson; and (4) that Fridriksson did not have substantial business management training or experience. 4 7
None of these justifications was accepted by the court. The
court also agreed with the Commission that Fridriksson's application
was not taken seriously by the credit union, and that her qualifications were not compared with those of other applicants for the position.48 Citing testimony from the Commission hearing, the court
found Alaska USA's argument "unworthy of belief' and held that
sex was a factor in Alaska USA's decision not to promote
Fridriksson. 4 9
With respect to Alaska USA's contention that Fridriksson lacked
substantial management training or experience, [the employer]
never compared Fridriksson's qualifications with those of the successful applicant, Andrews, either in making the hiring decision,
or in explaining it to the hearing officer. Nor was such a comparison offered in other testimony. There was thus no compelling evi50
dence that Andrews was a preferable candidate to Fridriksson.
Nor was the court bothered by the fact that the Commission found
Alaska USA's conduct was not" 'intentionally and willfully discrim44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

Id at 807.
Id
Id at 808 (quoting McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802).
Id
Id
Id

50. Id at 809.
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inatory.' "15 The court stated: "Discrimination need not be pur'52
poseful to be unlawful under [the Alaska Human Rights Act]."
Justice Connor dissented, stating that he did not believe
Fridriksson had presented a prima facie case of discrimination; he
also stated that even if a prima facie case had been presented, Alaska
USA had articulated legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for
Fridriksson's rejection.5 3 Lack of experience was the main factor for
not promoting Fridriksson, in Justice Connor's view. Fridriksson
had no background in management or supervision and had not
worked for ten years prior to her four-month employment with
Alaska USA. In contrast, the individual hired by Alaska USA had
completed numerous college courses in business administration. Additionally, the successful applicant "had worked in the business
'54
world, albeit in sales positions.
Moreover, in Justice Connor's opinion, Alaska USA's record for
employing women did not evince a policy of discrimination. At the
time Fridriksson applied for the manager's position in Adak, Alaska
USA maintained four full-service branches. One of these branches
was managed by a woman. Between this time and the time of
Fridriksson's hearing before the Human Rights Commission, the
credit union hired twelve women and twenty men as managers at
55
eleven of its branches.
As stated above, the federal cases interpreting Title VII have
consistently held that a plaintiff alleging disparate discriminatory
treatment must show discriminatory motive. 56 The Alaska Supreme
Court in Fridriksson emphatically rejected this requirement when it
held that Fridriksson was the victim of discrimination, despite the
Commission's finding that the credit union's conduct was not intentionally and willfully discriminatory. The court did not explain why
it rejected the federal model for analyzing disparate treatment cases.
Instead, the court merely cited the concurring opinion of Justice Stevens in Califano v. Goldfarb57 for the proposition that unlawful discrimination could be an "'accidental byproduct of a traditional way
of thinking about females."'-58 Reliance on Goldfarb is misplaced,
however, since it involved a due process challenge to discriminatory
51. Id at 809 n.7.
52. Id
53. Id at 811 (Connor, J., dissenting).
54. Id
55. Id
56. See supra notes 10-35 and accompanying text.
57. 430 U.S. 199 (1977).
58. 642 P.2d at 809 n.7 (quoting Goldfarb, 430 U.S. at 223 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment)).
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payments under the Social Security Act, 59 not employment discrimination legislation.
B.

Strand v. PetersburgPublic Schools. The Burden of
Persuasion Shifts to the Employer

On April 12, 1977, the principal of Petersburg Elementary
School announced that he would resign at the end of the year. The
superintendent formally advertised the position, but due to an informal
school district policy of promoting Petersburg teachers to fil adninistrative
positions, local applications were considered most
strongly. Mel Stockton, a high school guidance counselor, applied
for the principal position. Claire Strand, an elementary school
teacher, also applied.
There were only two formal qualifications for the principal's
job: a master's degree and a state-issued principal's certificate.
Stockton had both. Strand had a master's degree, but did not have
the necessary principal's certificate. Nevertheless, she informed the
Board that she would receive the certificate before August 22, 1977,
60
the beginning date of employment for the position.
On June 14, 1977, the Petersburg school board announced its
decision to hire Stockton for the principal position. Six days later,
Strand filed a complaint with the Alaska State Commission for
Human Rights, alleging she was denied the position because of her
sex and age.
When the statutorily required conciliation discussions failed,
the Petersburg school district requested a public hearing. The hearing was held in Petersburg, on September 7, 1978.61 At the hearing,
all four school board members, two women and two men, testified as
to their reasons for hiring Stockton rather than Strand. Although the
board members were unanimous in their choice of Stockton, individual board members expressed different reasons for selecting Stockton
over Strand. Board members emphasized such attributes as "personality," "tact," "ability to deal with people," and "character. '62 In
addition, Stockton's rapport with teachers and parents and his leadership ability emerged as the prominent factors in the board's decision to choose him. Also important to some board members was
their feeling that Strand had once acted in an unprofessional manner
during negotiations with the school board. Board members felt that
59. 42 U.S.C. §§ 401-31 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
60. 659 P.2d at 1219-20 nn.2 & 4.
61. Strand v. Petersburg Public Schools, Alaska State Comm'n for Human
Rights, No. S-77-0620-319-E-E, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order,
(May 24, 1979), [hereinafter ASCHR decision, May 24, 1983].
1 62. 659 P.2d at 1220.
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be charged
such conduct was inappropriate for a person who would
63
with implementing school board policy as a principal.
On November 29, 1978, the Commission's hearing officer found
that the school district had unlawfully discriminated against Strand.
In this proposed decision, the hearing officer awarded Strand back
pay representing the difference between her teacher's salary and
what she would have received as principal for the period of two
years or the term of Stockton's initial contract, whichever was less.
In addition, the hearing officer directed the school district to establish objective, nondiscriminatory hiring procedures and to submit
them to the Executive Director of the Alaska State Commission on
Human Rights for review and approval. 64
At the administrative hearing in Petersburg, both parties agreed
that the McDonnell Douglas four-part test was the appropriate
framework for determining whether Strand had presented a prima
facie case of sex and age discrimination under the Alaska Human
Rights Act. 65 In her proposed decision, the hearing officer discussed
McDonnell Douglas at some length, analyzed the facts under McDonnell Douglas's four-part test, and apparently concluded that
Strand failed to present a prima facie case. Citing Olson v. PhilcoFord,66 the hearing officer noted that something more than the fact
that a qualified male was chosen over a qualified female for a position is necessary to show discrimination. "The mere fact that historically women, older people, minorities and other groups have been
subjected to discrimination should not suffice to incriminate an individual employer who has picked one of two qualified people for a
job."6 7
While having found, at least implicitly, that Strand had not
presented a prima facie case of discrimination under McDonnell
Douglas, the hearing officer went on to hold that Strand had made
out a prima facie case under the standards of Muldrow v. State,68 a
previous administrative decision of the Alaska State Commission for
Human Rights. In Muldrow, the Commission for Human Rights
held that a complainant established a prima facie case of discrimination by the mere showing that she was a member of a protected class,
63. Id at 1225 (Rabinowitz, J., dissenting).
64. Strand v. Petersburg Public Schools, No. S-77-0620-319-E-E, Proposed Order Alaska State Comm'n for Human Rights, (November 29, 1978) [hereinafter ASCHR proposed order, November 29, 1978].
65. ALASKA STAT. § 8.80.220 (1981).
66. 531 F.2d 474 (10th Cir. 1976).
67. ASCHR proposed order, November 29, 1978, supra note 64, at 8 (citing
Olson v. Philco-Ford, 531 F.2d 474, 478 (10th Cir. 1976)).
68. Muldrow v. State, Alaska State Comm'n for Human Rights, No. A-740920-093-E-E (July 27, 1977) [hereinafter ASCHR decision, July 27, 1977].
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that she applied and was qualified for the position, and that she was
rejected in favor of a white male. 69 In short, according to the hearing officer's analysis, Strand made out a prima facie case of discrimination by showing that she had applied for the principal position,
was qualified for the position, and was rejected in favor of Mel
Stockton, a white male.70 According to the hearing officer, the
school district bore the burden of rebutting Strand's prima facie case
by presenting legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for hiring Stockton rather than Strand.
At the time the heaiing officer's first proposed order was written, federal law was ill-defined regarding the appropriate burden of
proof for a defendant seeking to rebut a prima facie case of employment discrimination. McDonnell Douglas required the defendant to
"articulate" a legitimate, nondiscriminatory explanation for the allegedly discriminatory conduct. 7 1 Some lower courts required the
a charge of discrimination by a "preponderance
defendant to rebut
'72
evidence.
the
of
Just as she rejected the federal standard for establishing a prima
facie case of employment discrimination, the hearing officer also rejected federal precedent regarding the defendant's burden of proof
when rebutting a prima facie case. Relying in part on Brown v.
Wood,73 an Alaska Supreme Court decision interpreting Alaska's
Equal Pay for Women Act,74 the hearing officer ruled that the school
district was75 required to rebut Strand's case by "clear and convincing
evidence."
The hearing officer's proposed findings of fact and conclusions
of law were forwarded to the Commission for Human Rights. The
Commission determined that the hearing officer had misconstrued
the Commission's previous decision in Muldrow in finding that
Strand had established a prima facie case of discrimination. The
Commission directed the hearing officer to submit a modified decision clarifying the Commission's intent in Muldrow and resolving
the Strand case accordingly.
69. See ASCHR proposed order, November 29, 1978, supra note 64, at 8 (citing
Muldrow).
70. Curiously, although the hearing officer held that Strand had made out a
prima facie case of sex discrimination, she did not apply the Muldrow test to
Strand's charge of age discrimination. Since Stockton was younger than Strand,
under the hearing officer's analysis, Strand also made out a prima facie case of age
discrimination.
71. 411 U.S. at 802.
72. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
73. 575 P.2d 760, 768 n.ll (Alaska 1978).
74. ALASKA STAT. § 23.10.155 (1981).
75. ASCHR proposed order, November 29, 1978, supra note 64, at 11.
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In the modified decision, the Commission explained:
[We have considered the entire record, the hearing examiner's
proposed findings of fact, conclusions of law, and order and the
written objections of the parties. In reading the hearing officer's
recommendations, we observed that she felt constrained by our
previous decision in Muldrow v. State ofAlaska... to find that
the complainant had established a prima facie case. We agree
with the hearing examiner's conclusions that such a result would
not comport with federal law or sound legal reasoning. It was,
moreover, never our intent to have Muldrow interpreted as altering the nature of the prima facie case from that set forth in [McDonnell Douglas.]76
In the modified decision, the Commission for Human Rights
embraced McDonnellDouglas as the appropriate test for establishing
a prima facie case. The Commission then held that Strand failed to
establish a prima facie case of sex or age discrimination. Following
McDonnellDouglas, the Commission found that no inference of discrimination is raised from the selection of one qualified applicant
over a qualified applicant from a protected class. 77 Although the
Commission found that the school district's hiring procedures were
subjective, the Commission did not find this fact sufficient to establish Strand's prima facie case.
Nevertheless, in its decision the Commission deplored the
school district's subjective hiring practices, and expressly found the
Board's hiring procedures unlawful. Accordingly, the Commission
did not disturb that part of the hearing officer's original proposed
order requiring the school district to draft a written hiring policy and
to submit the policy to the Executive Director of the Alaska Commission for Human Rights for approval.
Neither Strand nor the school district was satisfied with the
Commission's decision. Strand filed a motion for reconsideration,
and the school district filed a notice of appeal in superior court seeking to overturn that part of the decision requiring the district to redraft its hiring procedures. In response to Strand's petition for
reconsideration, the hearing officer issued a new proposed decision
revising the Commission's initial decision.78 This proposed decision
was issued on July 19, 1979, and adopted by the Commission on
August 17, 1979. In the new decision, the Commission found that
Strand had indeed presented a prima facie case of sex discrimination
under the McDonnellDouglas test. Moreover, the Commission ruled
that the application of subjective hiring procedures to Strand was
76. ASCHR decision, May 24, 1979, supra note 61, at 1-2 (emphasis added).
77. Id at 2.
78. ASCHR decision, August 17, 1979, supra note 6, at 7.
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sufficient to establish a prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas's
four-part test.
The case is admittedly a "borderline" one, subject to different resolution, depending on which pieces of evidence are deemed relevant in evaluating complainant's prima facie case and her
satisfaction of her fundamental burden of proving discrimination
by a preponderance of the evidence. It is now the Commission's
determination that application of the subjective hiring practices to
Strand, along with her proof of the first three McDonnellDouglas
to establish a prima facie case of
elements, suffice
79
discrimination.
After reversing itself and finding that Strand had established a
prima facie case of discrimination under McDonnell Douglas, the
Commission went on to find that the school board had not established legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for hiring Stockton instead of Strand. According to the Commission, Strand had the
burden of proving discrimination by a preponderance of the evidence. The school board, however, was required to rebut Strand's
prima facie case by the higher "clear and convincing evidence" standard.80 Moreover, the Commission found that the school district
failed to rebut Strand's case "by even a preponderance of the evidence." 8' Disposing of the school board's testimony in perfunctory
fashion, the Commission concluded by observing that the discrimination may arise from subtle preconceptions of which the respondents themselves are not completely aware. Until applicants are
measured fairly and evenly against reasonably objective8 2standards,
the employer cannot know what the decision should be.
The superior court overturned the Commission's decision. The
judge reversed both the Commission's findings of fact and conclusions of law. With regard to the former, the judge challenged the
Commission's finding that the school district did not compare Strand
and Stockton as to their administrative abilities and their ability to
work with students, teachers, and parents. 83 As the judge noted, the
hearing record reflected that each school board member knew the
applicants personally, and that each board member expressed his or
her reasons for hiring Stockton over Strand. "[I]t simply flies in the
that the Board memface of the evidence," the judge stated, "to find
'84
bers did not compare the two candidates.
79. Id at 6-7.
80. Id at 11.
81. Id at 8.
82. Id
83. Petersburg Public Schools v. Strand, Civ. No. IKE79-298, slip op. at 4 (Sup.
Ct. Alaska August 13, 1980).
84. Id
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With regard to the Commission's conclusions of law, the judge
ruled that Strand had failed to present a prima facie case of discrimination. Although he acknowledged the Commission's position that
"lack of objective guidelines" might constitute a discriminatory
practice, the judge did not believe there was sufficient evidence to
support a finding that the hiring criteria were employed unevenly in
this particular situation.8 5
Both Strand and the Commission appealed the judge's decision
to the Alaska Supreme Court. In the majority opinion, written by
Justice Matthews, 6 the superior court decision was reversed and the
Commission's finding of discrimination was reinstated.8 7 According
to the court, the Commission's finding that Strand was the victim of
discrimination was based on substantial evidence. In particular, the
court relied on the evidence suggesting the school board did not
compare the personal qualities on which it relied in hiring Stockton
with the same qualities in Strand. In addition, the evidence that Petersburg had hired nine administrators in twenty-five years, all of
them male, was a significant factor in the court's decision. 8
In two previous decisions 89 the court had accepted the four-part
McDonnellDouglas test as the analytical framework for establishing
a prima facie case of employment discrimination. In the court's
view, Strand met the first three requirements of the test: she was a
member of a protected class; she applied and was qualified for the
principal position; and she was rejected. With regard to the fourth
element, the court adopted the view expressed in the Commission's
revised administrative decision. "A wide variety of evidentiary patterns may suffice to establish a prima facie case; the primary inquiry
is whether a claimant has demonstrated circumstances which, if
otherwise unexplained by the employer, make it appear likely that
impermissible factors played a role in the employer's decision." 90
According to the court, Strand established that the Petersburg
school board failed to fairly compare her qualities with those of
Stockton. "[T]hat is more than sufficient to give rise to a prima facie
case." 91 In addition, the court relied on "statistical evidence" to but85. Id at 5.
86. The majority decision in Alaska USA Federal Credit Union v. Fridriksson,
642 P.2d 804 (Alaska 1982) was also written by Justice Matthews.
87. 659 P.2d 1223.
88. Id
89. Alaska USA Federal Credit Union v. Fridriksson, 642 P.2d 804, 806
(Alaska 1982); Alaska State Comm'n. for Human Rights v. Yellow Cab, 611 P.2d
487, 490 (Alaska 1980). The supreme court decided both cases after the Commission
rendered its decision in Strand
90. 659 P.2d at 1222 n.7.
91. Id at 1222 (footnote omitted).
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tress its holding that Strand was a victim of sex discrimination. Citing Brown v. Wood,92 the court stated that once a prima facie case of
discrimination is established, statistical evidence may be used to
justification is only a
show that the employer's nondiscriminatory
93
pretext for active discrimination.
Justice Rabinowitz filed a dissenting opinion, in which he was
joined by Chief Justice Burke.94 Justice Rabinowitz pointed out
that, under federal law, once a complainant establishes a prima facie
case the employer is obligated only to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the allegedly discriminatory conduct. This,
according to Rabinowitz, the school board had done in Strand
Moreover, Justice Rabinowitz believed that the statistical evidence
on which the majority relied was meaningless.
The fact that the Petersburg School System had not hired a female
principal is in my view of little significance. That fact alone says
nothing about discriminatory practices. Without information regarding the number of applicants for a given position and about
the gender composition of the applicant pool, it is meaningless to
state that an employer's past hiring decisions are evidence of discrimination. Obviously, if there were no qualified women in the
were hired indicates nothing
applicant pool the fact that only men
95
about the employer's preferences.
Justice Rabinowitz also noted that, in addition to those of Strand
and Stockton, the school district received fourteen applications for
the position of principal. At least thirteen of the applications were
from men. The gender of the fourteenth applicant was not ascertainable. "I have a great deal of difficulty concluding that an employer
who rejects thirteen, perhaps fourteen, men and one woman has
thereby demonstrated its intent to discriminate on the basis of
96
gender."
Although the majority opinion in Strand did not address the
issue of the employer's burden in rebutting a prima facie case, it
seems clear that the court rejected the United States Supreme Court
92. 575 P.2d 760 (Alaska 1978).
93. 659 P.2d at 1222.
94. Id at 1223 (Rabinowitz, J., dissenting).
95. Id at 1226.
96. Id Both Justices Rabinowitz and Burke have solid records supporting
human rights; thus, the fact that they dissented in Strand is significant. Both voted
with the majorities in Fridriksson and Yellow Cab, two decisions in which the
supreme court upheld Human Rights Commission decisions finding sex discrimination in employment. Justice Connor, who had dissented in Fridriksson and Yellow
Cab, did not participate in the Strand decision. Superior Court Judge Brian
Shortell, sitting by assignment pursuant to ALASKA CONST. art. IV § 316, replaced
Justice Connor. Judge Shortell voted with the majority. Had Justice Connor participated in the Strand decision, it is very likely that Rabinowitz's dissenting opinion
would have been the majority opinion.
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decisions under Title VII that place the burden of persuasion on the
plaintiff. In contrast to Texas Department of Community Affairs v.
Burdine,97 which placed only the burden of production in rebutting
a prima facie case on the employer, the administrative decision in
Strand imposes the burden of persuasion on the school district once
a prima facie case is presented. The Alaska Supreme Court, by affirming the Commission's decision, rejected
the federal model for
98
deciding employment discrimination cases.
The Commission's decision relied on Brown v. Wood 99 and McLean v. State'00 to support its conclusion that the employer has the
burden of persuasion in rebutting a prima facie case. Both cases
provide flimsy precedent. In McLean, the employer defended its admittedly discriminatory hiring practices on the ground that the demands of the job required sexually segregated positions. Although
Alaska law permits sex discrimination if the reasonable demands of
the position require a distinction based on sex, 0 1 the court held that
an employer seeking to utilize this exception must prove "by clear
02
and convincing evidence" that the exception is "amply justified."' 0 3
Brown was decided under Alaska's Equal Pay for Women Act,
not the Human Rights Act.' ° 4 In Brown, the Alaska Supreme Court
held that once an individual established that an employer paid employees of one sex more than employees of the other sex for equal
work, the employer must show by clear and convincing evidence that
this discrimination was justified. 105
The Alaska Supreme Court, by affirming the Commission's decision that Strand was a victim of discrimination, implicitly affirmed
the Commission's ruling that the burden of proof shifts to the employer in all cases after a claimant presents a prima facie case. This
extends the Commission's shift in the burden of proof to all cases
alleging discrimination, thus extending the holdings in McLean and
97. 450 U.S. 248 (1981).
98. In Felten v. Trustees of Cal. Univs. & Colleges, 703 F.2d 1507 (9th Cir.
1983), a Title VII sex discrimination suit, the court reversed a district court's allocation of the burden of persuasion which was similar to the allocation in the Strand
decision. The Ninth Circuit rejected the district court's view that the employer bore
the burden of rebutting the plaintiffs prima facie case by clear and convincing evidence in accord with Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248
(1981), and United States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aiken, 103 S. Ct. 1478
(1983).
99. 575 P.2d 760 (Alaska 1978).
100. 583 P.2d 867 (Alaska 1978).
101. ALASKA STAT. § 18.80.220(a)(1) (1981).

102. McLean, 583 P.2d at 869-70.

103. ALASKA STAT. § 23.10.155 (repealed 1980).
104. Id § 18.80.220(a)(1) (1981).
105. 575 P.2d at 768.
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Brown much further than their logic dictates and further than is warranted to achieve the purposes behind the Alaska Human Rights
Act. Since under McDonnell Douglas the plaintiff can make out a
prima facie case of discrimination on sketchy evidence, the employer's burden in disproving discrimination is significantly greater
than the employee's burden in showing discriminatory conduct.
Without legislative sanction, such a shift in the allocation of the burden of proof appears to be, at worst, a violation of due process of law
and, at best, a judicial intrusion into a sphere more properly reserved
to the legislature. As a result of Strand's affirmance of the Commission's decision, the federal standard is discarded without explanation. All that is required for the imposition of substantial damages
after a plaintiff accuses an employer of discrimination is the presentation of any evidence capable of being interpreted as indicating discrimination. The only way an employer can avoid this result under
the current burden of proof requirement is to prove by clear and
convincing evidence that he did not engage in discrimination.
C. The Result of the Court's Departure from McDonnell Douglas
in Strand andFridriksson: Affirmative Action

Under McDonnell Douglas, the plaintiffs prima facie case creates an inference of discriminatory intent which the employer can
dispel by bringing forward legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for
its hiring decision. The plaintiffs prima facie case and the employer's articulation of legitimate reasons in support of its actions
constitute the two initial steps in the order of allegation and proof.
The third step in the order of proof - the most important step under
federal law - is the plaintiffs burden to persuade the court that the
reasons articulated by the employer are a mere pretext for discriminatory intent. It is this third step which the Alaska- Supreme Court,
through Strand and Fridriksson, tacitly eliminated from litigation
arising under the Human Rights Act. Apparently the litigation is at
an end once the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case and the employer sets forth reasons in support of his decision. Unlike litigation
under Title VII or the traditional common law order of proof, the
ultimate question - whether the employer's choice violated the
mandate of the Human Rights Act - now depends not on the plaintiff successfully carrying the burden of persuasion, but on the weight
of the employer's evidence compared to the inference of discrimination produced by the plaintiff's prima facie case. Evidently the
plaintiff need not attempt to persuade the court that the employer's
evidence is a mere pretext for discrimination. Instead, the plaintiff
may rest on the prima facie case and allow the court to determine
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whether the employer's evidence sufficiently rebuts the inference of
unlawful discrimination.
The court's abandonment of McDonnell Douglas'sthird step for
the order of allegation and proof explains Fridrksson'sholding that
discrimination need not be willful or intentional to be illegal. In litigation arising under the Human Rights Act, the plaintiff is allowed
to benefit from an inference of intent drawn by the court from the
prima facie case if the employer fails to meet his burden of proof in
disproving discrimination in hiring. In other words, shifting the burden of proof to the employer dispenses with the need for the third
step of McDonnellDouglas. This eliminates the requirement that the
plaintiff prove discriminatory intent.
The Strand and Fridricksson decisions are a radical departure
from the original purposes of both the Human Rights Act and Title
VII. The statutes are anti-discriminatory. To that end, they prohibit
adverse action against members of protected classes. The statutes
demonstrate neither a facial intent nor a legislative mandate that
protected classes be treated more favorably than unprotected classes.
The court blurred this distinction between nondiscrimination
and compensation in Strand and Fridriksson. When read together,
these cases impose a type of affirmative action requirement on
Alaska employers. In effect, these cases force an employer who seeks
to avoid the burden of litigation to prefer an applicant from a protected class, who meets the minimal job qualifications, over an applicant from an unprotected class with the same qualifications. This is
also true when the member of the unprotected class has qualities
such as additional training or experience or a record of success in
similar employment which would make him more attractive than the
applicant from the protected class. Under Pridrikssonthese qualities
are deemed "mere preferences" and cannot justify the employer's
decision unless, at a minimum, they are listed as requirements for
the position and documented as justifications when the hiring decision is made.
Members of a protected class are thus placed in a position superior to that of members of an unprotected class when competing for
the same job. Such an interpretation of the burden of proof by the
Alaska Supreme Court does not simply remove the barriers to employment heretofore experienced by protected classes, but also gives
them an advantage over unprotected classes. This preference makes
the Human Rights Act an affirmative action statute. If this result is
to be the mandate of Alaska's law of employment discrimination, the
legislature should amend the Human Rights Act. The choice between affirmative action and equal opportunity is more properly left
to the legislature. The supreme court can best implement the princi-
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pie of equal opportunity embodied in the language of the present
Human Rights Act by retreating from the holdings in Strand and
Fridricksson and adhering to federal precedent. But, for the time
being, employers in Alaska will simply have to live with the fact that
the supreme court, in rejecting McDonnell Douglas, has made employment discrimination litigation more onerous to defendants and
the Human Rights Act more attractive than Title VII to potential
plaintiffs. Under the court's present interpretation, employers bear
not only the burden of proving they did not discriminate, but also a
substantially greater risk of being deemed guilty of discrimination
under state law than under federal law.
IV.

ST,4ND AND FiIDRIKSSON" HOSTILITY TOWARD
UNQUANTIFIED SUBJECTIVE HIRING CRITERIA

Although the Alaska Supreme Court has often professed to
adopt federal standards for analyzing employment discrimination
cases, 10 6 Strand and Fridriksson demonstrate that the court is only
paying lip service to the federally fashioned analytical framework.
These cases also reflect the court's hostile attitude toward any subjective hiring practices. Perhaps this unarticulated hostility best explains the Strand and Fridriksson departures from federal standards.
In neither Strand nor Fridriksson did the Commission for
Human Rights find the employer guilty of intentional discrimination. In Fridriksson, the hearing officer specifically found that the
employer did not intentionally discriminate. 10 7 In Strand,the Commission originally held that the school district did not discriminate
against Strand and later changed its mind. There seems little question the Commission would not have made its initial decision that
the school district was innocent of discrimination if it believed that
the school district's hiring decision was based on discriminatory motives. Moreover, the evidence of discrimination in both cases is extremely weak and contradictory. The Petersburg school board was
made up of two men and two women, and yet three supreme court
justices believed the four school board members committed an unlawful act of sex discrimination. Alaska USA Credit Union had a
commendable record for hiring women as managers for its branch
offices, but the credit union was found to have unlawfully discriminated when it failed to hire a woman with very meager credentials
for a manager position.
In both Strand and Fridriksson, the Alaska Supreme Court
demonstrated hostility toward subjective hiring practices. In Strand,
106. See cases cited supra note 3.
107. See 642 P.2d at 809 n.7.
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the Petersburg school board was censured for failing to compare objectively the desirable qualities of a male applicant with similar
qualities in a female applicant. 108 In Fridriksson, the credit union's
desire to hire a manager with supervisory experience was deemed a
"mere preference" and not an "objective" criterion for the job. 10 9 As
in Strand, the court stated its belief that the credit union did not
compare
Fridriksson's qualifications with those of the male who was
0
hired.11
The most unfortunate aspect of the court's decisions is the cavalier disregard of federally sanctioned hiring practices for managers
and supervisors. Many employers rely on subjective factors in their
hiring decisions. In this context, the use of subjective hiring criteria
means simply the common sense evaluation of a job applicant's
qualifications and the position's requirements, both tangible and intangible. Factors such as personality, ability to deal with people,
leadership skills, and similar intangible qualities generally enter into
the hiring decisions for managers. Federal courts have recognized
the employer's need to pick supervisory employees using these subjective hiring criteria."' The rational justification for this consensus
in the federal courts is that the objective hiring criteria appropriate
for hiring blue collar workers and lower management personnel are
upper manageinappropriate and incomplete for hiring supervisors,
12
ment personnel, professionals, and administrators.
Strand and Fridriksson are clear signals that the Alaska
Supreme Court has rejected the federal view permitting subjective
hiring criteria. Strand suggests that employers adopt a checklist
whereby each job applicant is compared against each job criterion."13 There are two obvious problems with the court's approach.
108. 659 P.2d at 1221-22.
109. 642 P.2d at 807.

110. Id at 809.
111. See, e.g., Pinckney v. County of Northampton, 512 F. Supp. 989, 1001 (E.D.
Pa. 1981), a'd, 681 F.2d 808 (3d Cir. 1982).
112. A discussion of the application of Title VII to professional and managerial
positions is beyond the scope of this article. This topic has been the subject of much
scholarly commentary. See Bartolet, Applicationof Title VII to Jobsin High Places,
95 HARv. L. REv. 947 (1982); see also Hunt & Pazuniak, Special Problemsin Litigating Upper Level Employment Discrimination Cases, 4 DEL. J. Cou. 114 (1978);
Maltz, Title VII in UpperLevel Employment -A Response to ProfessorBartolet, 77
Nw. L. REv. 776 (1982). The federal courts have been particularly reluctant to involve themselves in the hiring and tenure decisions of educational institutions, and
this phenomenon has been commented on extensively. See Friedman, Congress, the
Courts,andSex-Based Employment in Education: A Tale of Two Titles, 34 VAND. L.
REv. 37 (1981); Yurko, JudicialRecognition of.Academic Collective Interest: A New
Approach to Faculty Title VII Litigation, 60 B.U.L. Rnv. 473 (1980); Note, Tenure
and Partnershipin Title VII Remedies, 94 HARv. L. Rnv. 457 (1980).
113. 659 P.2d at 1221.
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First, a point-by-point comparison of job candidates against criteria
may give the appearance of objectivity, but hiring decisions will obviously still be a subjective process. For example, in Strand, the

school board members stressed the importance of "personality,"
"tact," and "ability to deal with people."' 1

4

Even if these traits were

reduced to written form and both Strand and Stockton were compared based on these qualities, the process would be subjective.

Each school board member still would have chosen Stockton over
Strand, and each school board member would have done so for a

subjective reason. It is difficult to understand why the failure to
quantify this process rises to the level of illegal discrimination.
Second, the court's approach, taken to its logical conclusion, denies that application of any subjective criteria is proper in hiring de-

cisions. In Strand,the Petersburg school board apparently gave less
weight to Strand's lack of administrative experience than to a single
incident of her "unprofessional" conduct during collective bargaining. Consideration of such unprofessional conduct was appropriate
because the principal is part of an administrative team charged with
implementing the school board's educational goals.1 1 5 Surely, a

school board's responsibility to conduct the day-to-day operation of
the schools should include the right to make subjective, nondiscriminatory decisions about who is best suited to administer and imple-

ment school policy.
V. A SUGGESTED APPROACH TO MINIMIZE THE EFFECT OF THE
COURT'S DISCARDING OF THE FEDERAL STANDARD

Alaska employers rightfully may deplore the supreme court's
decisions in Strand and Fridriksson,• they would be wise, however, to
reevaluate their hiring procedures in light of these opinions. Em-

ployers hiring school principals, bank managers, and other supervi114. Id at 1220.
115. In Tunley v. Municipality of Anchorage School Dist., 631 P.2d 67 (Alaska
1981), the Alaska Supreme Court expressly recognized the school board's authority
to administer the local schools.
Historically, Americans have considered schools to be an extension of the
local community. Thus, although state legislatures possess plenary power
over the educational system, local initiative with respect to education is so
highly regarded that most states have delegated extensive authority over
the actual administration of the schools to local institutions. States have
divided their territory into "school districts" that perform the sole function
of establishing and maintaining the public schools. Boards of education,
commonly referred to as school boards, have been created as the governing
body of the school district and are typically responsible for the day-to-day
operation of the public schools.
Id at 67 n.17 (quoting from Project, Education and the Law. State Interests and
Individual Rights, 74 MICH. L. Rnv. 1373, 1380 (1976) (footnotes omitted)).
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sory or administrative employees should adopt formal, written
criteria before filling these jobs. Thus, if leadership qualities, personality, and ability to deal with clients or the public are important,
these criteria should be stated objectively in such a way that each
applicant for a job can be quantitatively measured against such criterion. As a safeguard, employers should adopt formal written checklists against which prospective personnel are judged; these records
should be retained. Such guidelines will provide evidence of an employer's objective, nondiscriminatory motive in the event a disappointed job applicant files an employment discrimination complaint.
Employers who continue to rely on vague, undocumented generalizations to explain their employment decisions may find themselves
in the position of the Alaska USA Federal Credit Union or the
Petersburg public school system. In other words, the Alaska
Supreme Court may be sitting in on the employers' hiring committees and making the final employment decisions.
VI.

CONCLUSION

In Strand v. PetersburgPublic Schools, 116 the Alaska Supreme
Court implicitly endorsed the Commission for Human Rights' standard for analyzing employment discrimination cases. The Commission's procedure provides that once a claimant has presented a prima
facie case of discrimination, the employer must rebut that case by
clear and convincing evidence. Thus, the employer's burden of disproving discrimination is far greater than the employee's burden of
indicating discriminatory conduct.
In Alaska USA Federal Credit Union v. Fridriksson,117 the
Alaska Supreme Court held that an employer may commit an unlawful discriminatory act without intending to do so. This holding
rejects the United States Supreme Court decisions which require a
plaintiff to prove discriminatory motive to prevail in a case alleging
disparate, discriminatory treatment.
Both Strand and Fridriksson demonstrate the Alaska Supreme
Court's hostility to the use of any subjective hiring criteria by employers, even when employers are hiring administrators or supervisors. Alaska employers would be wise to adopt written objective
guidelines articulating the qualities they seek in an applicant for a
position and to judge each applicant against the same criteria.
Strand and Fridriksson inject a great deal of needless uncertainty into employment discrimination law. Although the Alaska
Supreme Court professes to accept federal case law analyzing em116. 659 P.2d 1218 (Alaska 1983).
117. 642 P.2d 804 (Alaska 1982).
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ployment discrimination, Strand and Fridriksson highlight the
court's radical departure from these federal precedents. As a result,
it is almost impossible for employers to assess whether nonobjective
hiring procedures will pass muster under Alaska law. Certainly, the
Fridriksson ruling that employment discrimination can be unintentional makes it very difficult for an employer to know whether he is
complying with the Alaska Human Rights Act.
If the court would adhere more closely to federal case law interpreting Title VII, Alaska employers could be more certain whether
their hiring decisions will withstand potential allegations of unlawful
discrimination in violation of the Human Rights Act. The United
States Supreme Court's holding in Texas Department of Community
Affairs v. Burdine118 that the burden of persuasion in an employment
discrimination case never shifts from the plaintiff is a sensible standard and should be adopted by the Alaska Supreme Court. The
United States Supreme Court's position that a plaintiff must show
intentional discrimination in a disparate treatment case"1 9 also
makes sense, and is much easier to apply than the Fridriksson holding that an employer may commit an unlawful act of employment
discrimination without intending to do so. An adoption of the federal standard would benefit employers without detracting from the
ability of the Commission for Human Rights to protect Alaska employees from genuine unlawful discrimination.

118. 450 U.S. 248 (1981).
119. See supra note 12.

